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Abstract This is an STS case study of the social decision-making process on the
siting of a nuclear power plant in Japan, from the point of view of a sociological case
analysis. Energy technologies are critically important for industrial society but often
trigger serious disputes through the R&D phase and the phase involving introduction
into society. Nuclear power technology especially has provoked a lot of conflicts all
over the world. By focusing on serious trust issues among decision-making
processes and stakeholders, we found very interesting consequences and/or results
of participatory social decision-making process in nuclear issues. As an example, we
take up the case of a local referendum in the siting area (Maki-machi town, Niigata
prefecture of Japan) and describe and analyze it to highlight the critical sociological
factors involved in the application of participatory methods in social decision-
making processes regarding technological issues. Through this description and
analysis, we would like to emphasize the effects of the complicated and subtle
structure of local context on the consequence of local decision-making processes.
We then propose a concept, “relevant marginal actor,” to clarify which actors play
critical roles in the whole local decision-making process in which controversial
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Introduction
This paper is an STS (Science, Technology and Society) case study which sheds new
light on the social decision-making processes of Japanese nuclear power plant siting
within local contexts. In order to highlight the critical factors involved in the
application of participatory methods in a social decision-making process regarding
technological issues, the analysis of the case study has been carried out mainly from
a sociological perspective. Through this analysis, we would like to emphasize the
effects of the local context on the consequence of local decision-making processes.
We then propose a concept, “relevant marginal actor,” to clarify which actors play
critical roles in the whole local decision-making process in relation to controversial
technological issues, such as nuclear power plant siting.
The commercial use of nuclear power technology is typically very controversial
all over the World.1 It is often very difficult to find unique optimal solutions in
nuclear policy in general, and compromise and contingency usually play a role in the
site selection in particular. In Japan, there has been a serious dispute centering on
nuclear policy since the 1950s. Today, there are serious trust issues between
stakeholders, with the result that, in an attempt to counteract these issues, various
participatory processes have become necessary.2 In 1996, the Japanese government,
1Kaplan (2000) is an excellent example of the study of the local controversies on nuclear power plant
issues.
2Yearly (1992) analyzed the “green ambivalence” of social movements. He pointed out that the
movements took their basis from scientific knowledge, whereas they did not trust the science and its
knowledge. In Japanese disputes on nuclear power development, there have been similar phenomena.
They have often resorted to technological controversies (especially on safety issues), while they have
looked askance at the established experts regime.
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prompted by the accident at the “Monju” fast breeder reactor (FBR),3 set up “The
Round Table Conference on Nuclear Policy.” This conference tends to be regarded
as an epoch-making event because for the first time in almost 40 years of Japanese
nuclear power program history, the government invited several representatives from
the anti-nuclear side. The round table conference method attracted both public and
academic attention, and set up an atmosphere which demanded more participatory
decision-making processes on so-called STS issues in Japan. However, the
conference did not produce clear decisions on Japanese nuclear policy, and many
experts were of the opinion that the conference was an unsuitable setting for
substantial discussion.4 Pickett commented that the conference could not even
achieve consensus on the goal of the conference itself, meaning that the participants
were unable to enter intensive discussions on each particular issue. Oyama drew
attention to another problem from the context of policy and administration studies.
He pointed out that although the conference did collect a wide range of opinions, the
lack of a well-defined position for the conference within the context of the whole
national policy making process on nuclear power was a problem. He argued that the
conference had potential as a participatory policy assessment (PPA) which could
have made nuclear policy more flexible, and that the government should have made
this clear. Although Oyama recognized the significance of the conference as the first
trial case of PPA and argued it should be continued, the conference has been
suspended since 1999. Consequently, the conference is often cited as an example of
the difficulties of the participatory approach to nuclear issues.
There have been few studies which analyze the highly complicated social
consequences and factors involved in the round table conference, both of which are
crucial for the utilization and implementation of the participatory decision-making
process. Nevertheless, with the identification of these factors still incomplete, the hot
issue of Japanese STS research soon changed to other participatory methods, such as
4Pickett (1999). Also see Oyama (2002).
3On Dec. 8, 1995, 700 kg of sodium leaked from the secondary coolant system of the Monju FBR and
caused a fire. At that time, the reactor was in the trial phase preparatory for regular operation. Though the
accident itself was not fatal, there were no appropriate responses and the crisis management of the PNC
(Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, a special governmental corporation for
research and development of nuclear fuel cycle systems and FBRs) was strongly criticized by the public.
They did not disclose a video of the site which had been taken shortly after the accident occurred; instead
showing a very short and edited movie to reporters. Media learned about the other video after several days,
and the PNC was forced to disclose it after having denied the existence of any other films. They lost
credibility and the government began to consider reforming the organization. PNC reorganized in 1998
and merged into the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in 2005. The operation of Monju reactor is not
permitted but JAEA plans to begin improvements in the near future. Monju is a prototype FBR and the
second fast reactor built in Japan. Its construction began in 1985, and it attained criticality for the first time
in April 1994. It is the successor of the experimental fast reactor “Joyo,” which has operated since 1977.
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the consensus conference.5 What is observed here is a move from one imported
method to another without substantial ex ant critical examination and ex post critical
assessment, and the pattern repeats itself.6 Recently, some Japanese STS researchers
once again changed their focus from participatory TA (technology assessment) to
science communication methods including the so-called “science café.” The change
seems to represent a shift of attention, leaving behind the critical examination and
assessment of consensus conferences in relation to the actual social decision-making
process.7 In our opinion, it is very important for STS to carry out critical reflective
studies on the conditions and effects of the participatory method.8 Such critical
reflective studies are essential to the utilization and implementation of the latest
participatory methods to improve current social decision-making processes with
relation to science and technology. Therefore, here we try to analyze the complicated
social processes and consequences of a participatory decision-making case in detail.
We adopted a case method and sociological perspective (specifically, sociology of
science and technology) to clarify the social factors which are critical to the
consequences of participatory decision-making processes in the local area considered
in this paper. The controversies of scientific/technological issues have been taken up
as one of the most remarkable phenomena in the science-technology-society
interface. It is well known that many sociologists have worked in this area and
produced a number of contributions to STS studies. Dorothy Nelkin has reviewed
controversy studies from the early 1970s, analyzing the structure and consequences
of various case studies and highlighting specific patterns of scientific controversy.9
She categorized the scientific/technical controversies into four groups. According to
her categorization, nuclear plant siting disputes fall into controversy because of the
6There are several studies which include a plenty of raw information on the actual operation of consensus
conference written by advocates. Kobayashi (2004) is a report and comment by the facilitator of consensus
conference trial himself.
5In Japan, the first trial case of a consensus conference was held in 1998. Its theme was GMOs
(genetically modified organisms). It was conducted by several experts in STS. The second one was on the
diffusion of Internet and society in 1999. After these trials, many studies on the consensus conference
method were published one after another and a series of conferences on GMOs has been held since 2001.
They are sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The round table
conference on nuclear policy was considered a “failure,” and is usually neglected in discussions. Pickett
(1999) and Oyama (2002) are exceptional cases. Both authors are outside Japanese STS studies. Picket is a
US researcher at the engineering department of the University of Tokyo. Oyama is a scholar of policy and
administration studies.
7A few studies examine this point carefully and critically. Matsumoto (2002) reviewed the situation
centering around this point, then critically analyzed and proposed an alternative way to escape “the failure
of the science-technology-society interface” (a structural pitfall which produced unintended and fatal
errors). Kiba (2003) argued that participatory methods (including the consensus conference) should be
utilized to overcome “petit experts syndrome” (every citizen has very narrow view on STS issues and can
only propose sub-optimal solutions).
8For example, Lin (2006) is a reflective study which examines the negative aspects of the consensus
conference method based on data from several trials in Taiwan. It pointed out that the method may have a
negative influence in terms of social equality. It should be noted that this study was conducted by the
leader of the consensus conference trial himself.
9Nelkin (1992) is one of the most essential of her controversy studies.
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“tension between environmental values and political or economic priorities.”10 She
also pointed out the phenomenon that social conflict (like moral conflict) often tends
to be transformed into specialized scientific or technological controversy. These
categorizations and frameworks are useful to visualize the structure and consequen-
ces of scientific/technological controversies. Jasper followed Nelkin’s framework to
analyze the controversy surrounding nuclear technology in the US, France and
Sweden by comparative case studies, and described very close relationships between
political conflicts and technological controversies.11 Although these Nelkin-style
controversy studies indicate the structure and consequences of each dispute, we have
to take into consideration the effect of local contexts more closely.
In this vein, Kaplan pointed out that the initiatives of local residents can trigger
the introduction and institutionalization of participatory processes.12 He describes
the consequences of institutionalization of participatory methods in a case study of
the Hanford site in the US. It showed that participatory consensus building and
technology assessment in Western countries were initiated by residents via local
protest movements. According to the Hanford case and its analysis by Kaplan,
participatory methods were initiated by local citizens under a particular local context,
and as a result, the principle of public participation was implemented in the formal
(governmental) decision-making process. In other words, the emergence of dispute
and conflict amongst stakeholders, the introduction of participatory methods and the
institutionalization of participatory decision-making processes were a series of
consequences. Participatory processes were not devised by an expert in a far away
location and then applied to each case, rather they were initiated spontaneously by
citizens in the local community and developed in the particular social situation.
Therefore, we should carefully place the local participatory decision-making process
case within a local context in order to identify the social factors critical to the
consequences.13
In Japan, the past decade provides us with some remarkable local cases regarding
the siting of nuclear power plants. In particular, there were several significant cases
around the end of the 1990s. For example, the siting of a nuclear power plant was
cancelled by a local referendum in Maki-machi in Niigata prefecture. (The first
referendum was held in 1997, and the plan was finally cancelled in 2003.) In
Hokkaido prefecture, the northernmost of Japan’s main islands, a plan to build a new
plant received the approval of the Governor, which is legally essential, only after the




13Hecht (1998) describes the history of French nuclear development in terms of the effect of national
identity (“Frenchness”). He shows how the whole consequence of nuclear development has been
constructed under the influence of particular social contexts. It means the characteristics of the
consequences are different among countries, regions or societies. In other issues included in the STS
field, several studies pointed out the importance of local contexts in evaluation and tried to establish
theoretical frameworks to include it. Abelson (2001), Abelson et al. (2003) on local health-care policy in
Canada case and Thurston et al. (2005) on regional health policy are examples of them. Also see Smith
et al. (1997) in the environmental management field.
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committee had been continued from 1997 to 1999, and Governor’s final decision
was in 2000.)14
In our opinion, the Maki-machi case is a good example to use to think about the
critical conditions of participatory methods in local contexts. In this case, a
referendum was not suggested by outside experts, but adopted by local residents
spontaneously. A series of referendum movements resulted in the cancellation of the
proposal. This means that the referendum method could have a big influence on the
entire decision-making process. We would like to explore this case in detail, and try
to extract the critical social factors which gave validity to, and had impact on, the
referendum method. Cancellation of a nuclear power plant siting plan by local
referendum in Japan was unprecedented, so it attracted much public attention.
Of course, several researchers have already taken up the Maki-machi case from
various points of view.15 However, we feel it has not been fully discussed, in terms
of sociological studies, to identify critical social factors. As discussed above, in order
to utilize the lessons from cases studies to improve the social decision-making
process at the science-technology-society interface, we have not only to precisely
understand what happened, but also identify the social factors contributing to
particular consequences. For example, if we pick up the merits of the referendum
from the cases without showing the relevant social conditions in which it functions
well, we cannot make it effective in practical use.16
Therefore, we aim to re-interpret the Maki-machi case from a sociological point
of view, which has the following three focuses:
1. We focus on the “social decision-making process,” incorporating both formal
processes (legally binding, or institutionalized by law) and informal ones, rather
than the “policy making process.” The phrase “policy making process” gives the
impression that the study focuses only on processes in the “public” sector
(government or bureaucracy) in terms of administrative studies or political
science. In this paper, we analyze many events throughout the whole process,
not just inside the “public” sector alone. To make this point clear, we adopted
the term “social decision-making process” as a keyword of this study.17
2. This paper focuses on the critical social factors of key events during the case and
intends to understand the social role they played. We describe the case based on
a qualitative exploration, including interviewing local actors. We scrutinize the
case in terms of the effect of local context on the consequences of the process.
3. This paper is not intended to analyze national nuclear policy itself. We focus on
the process of social decision making, and try to propose a way to improve it. In
Japan, as elsewhere, the political circumstances surrounding nuclear policy often
16Stirling (2005) and Irwin (2006) examined the complicated structure around participatory practice
critically and pointed out the possibility to utilize participatory methods to maintain traditional initiatives
in the governance of science and technology.
17But we note here that recent policy studies also take the wider view, such as Kingdon (1995).
15Imai (2000) depicts it as a citizen movement and discusses the potential of the referendum method in
Japanese politics. Nakazawa (2005) analyzes the transformation process of the local community from the
point of view of the sociology of regionalism.
14We tried to analyze these cases from more of a policy-oriented stance in our former papers (Juraku et al.
2005, 2006).
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cannot allow an open-ended discussion, since an argument on nuclear policy
itself is not free from interest conflicts or mistrust between pro-nuclear and anti-
nuclear parties. This kind of atmosphere pollutes even academic discussion.
Therefore, we focus on process rather than policy.
We attempt to identify the social factors contributing to particular consequences in
the local context. Several factors which seem to define the sociological character-
istics of the case are highlighted. In particular, we address the critical effect of the
marginal agent (the voluntary group which planed and carried out the “citizen’s
referendum”) on the final consequences of the decision-making process in the Maki-
machi case and conceptualize it as “relevant marginal actor”. Finally, we also aim to
review some implications for the assessment and improvement of the quality of
decision-making processes in technology policy, based on the lessons from the
sociological STS case study.
Description of the Maki-machi Case — Cancellation of Power Plant Siting
by “Citizen’s Referendum”
Maki-machi (“machi” means “town” in Japanese) in Niigata prefecture is located
around the centre of Japan’s main island (Honshu), close to the Japan Sea coastline.
It is one of the most productive and famous rice-field zones in Japan. Though Maki-
machi had been a prosperous town since the middle ages, it had begun to lose some
of its past glory during the rapid industrialization of post-war Japan. The Maki-
machi nuclear power plant was an initiative by the Tohoku Electric Power
Corporation (Tohoku-EPCO), which has monopolized the regional power supply
of the Tohoku district18 since the late 1960s, under these economic circumstances.
The legal processes involved in siting of the plant seemed to proceed smoothly. But
in September 1983, the company withdrew their application for governmental
licensing (it was under the safety review process) and the siting process was
suspended. In their final confirmation review, Tohoku-EPCO found out that several
pieces of their planned site were not secured and, furthermore, one of them was
owned by anti-nuclear groups.19 There was also a legal dispute over the ownership
of the land in the proposed area. Part of the land was thought to be owned by the
town however, two Buddhist temples protested arguing their ownership. They
brought the issue to the courts, causing an obstacle to the continuation of the
governmental safety review process.
18In Japan, there are nine regional monopoly power utility companies. They have been protected by law
and cooperate with national government. Since 1995, the government has deregulated this scheme in
stages. But the market for home use is not open to other independent companies yet. And though the
consideration process on the deregulation of the home market was started from the spring of 2007, in July
2007 the working group on the deregulation issue founded by the government concluded to suspend the
intensive discussion “during a certain period” after only meeting twice.
19According to the Japanese nuclear power plant regulation system, utility companies have to ensure the siting
plan before receiving final governmental permission. In fact, government requires three conditions to consider
the plan “ensured”: (1) complete land acquisition, (2) agreement of compensation for the local fishery industry
and (3) approval of local council andmayor/governor. In this case, itmeant Tohoku-EPCOdid not complete land
acquisition, so that they could not get governmental permission to begin the construction.
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Moreover, the local conservative party,20 split since the beginning of the 20th
century,21 came into conflict on the nuclear power issue too. Though the party had
kept the administration in power, two political cliques won the mayoral election in
turns. The clique who lost the last election expressed a certain amount of caution
about the siting of the nuclear power plant in their election campaign, to gather the
support of a wide range of voters. But once they won the seat, the leader of the
clique was obliged to change his stance to be in favor of the nuclear power plant
plan.22 This is because the conservative party to which the two cliques both
belonged had clearly taken the pro-nuclear side in their national policy and the party
headquarters did not admit such inconsistency.23 In the next election, the opposite
clique criticized the “apostasy” of the incumbent and came back to the mayor’s
office. Therefore, the siting process was deadlocked during the 1980s.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the land issue was finally settled. The legal case
ended in favor of the town, and the area owned by the anti-nuclear group was
excluded in the modified construction plan. Kanji Sato, the mayor of Maki-machi at
the time, was able to integrate the two political cliques to promote the nuclear plant
plan strongly. He made the need for a power plant an issue in the mayoral campaign
of 1994 and was successfully reelected.24 The deadlocked plan began to crystallize
again with his reelection, despite the fact that the number of votes shared between
two opponents who were against the nuclear power project was higher than the
number of votes for the mayor.25
Some citizens, mainly self-employed individuals, raised questions about these
overall processes. They thought the decision should reflect the residents’ will
directly.26 Takaaki Sasaguchi, manager of his own Japanese sake brewery and later
23In addition, Prime Minister Tanaka was an enthusiastic advocate of nuclear power plant siting in rural
areas. He established laws which provided subsidy funds to local governments that accepted nuclear
plants. He believed that attracting huge facilities and developing social infrastructure, including highways
and the Shinkansen express train system are among the most effective ways to encourage regional
economic development.
24He succeeded in relaxing tension between two political cliques inside the local LDP and integrated two
local pro-nuclear groups. Until then, each clique had their own pro-nuclear movement group.
25Mayor Sato got 9,006 ballots, Mr. Muramatsu (took a deliberate stance on nuclear plant issue, but was
relatively critical of nuclear plant plan) got 6,245 ballots and Mr. Aisaka (anti-nuclear stance) got 4,382
ballots.
26This statement became their basic policy. In other words, they argued that the ‘democratic’ process was
essential. They did not take any particular stance on the nuclear plant issue itself. Kaplan (2000) pointed
out a similar phenomenon in the Hanford case in the US.
20In Japan, the conservative political party [Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)] has kept the national
administration in power from 1955 to 1993. They also keep the administration in power in most local
governments. In Niigata prefecture, their power has been very strong. Former Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka (1972–1974) was from this prefecture.
21Nakazawa (2005) points out that this conflict can be observed in the Taisho era (around 1915).
22Mayor Sato changed his attitude to nuclear issues in his third election campaign.
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to become leader of the local referendum movement group and subsequently Mayor
of Maki-machi, described the conversation at that time as follows:27
“We residents have to show ‘the public opinion’ clearly.”
“To do it, the referendum method is most effective and suitable, I think.”
“Can we do it?”
“The Mayor and the town council understand that if they do it, the cons vote will
be in majority. They will never allow a referendum.”
“Then, we try to do it voluntarily.”
“Yes, a self-management referendum.”
“But, is it permitted by the laws? Not illegal?”
They enlisted Tamio Takashima,28 a lawyer in Maki-machi and an anti-nuclear
activist, to discuss the legal issues. His opinion was that there was no legal problem.
They established the “Group to Hold a Referendum on the Maki Nuclear Plant”
(hereafter referred as the ‘referendum movement group’) on October 19, 1994.
Sasaguchi became the leader of the group. The founding members were 34 residents
of Maki-machi. Their mission was:
1. To request a referendum from the Maki-machi local government to confirm the
majority opinion on the pros and cons of the “Maki Nuclear Power Plant” plan.
2. If the local government does comply, carry out a self-managed referendum.
The members of the referendum movement group met Mayor Sato and requested
a local referendum on November 11, 1994. They also asked him for logistics support
for a citizen’s referendum if the local government would not comply.29 The local
government and the town council rejected both of their requests,30 so they decided to
hold a “citizen’s referendum” (that is to say, not authorized by any law).31 In order
not to be seen as a “biased” movement, the referendum movement group did not
29They requested that the mayor provide the public halls and town gymnasium as the voting stations,
provide the human resources for poll monitoring and materials for the vote.
28He joined the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s and has played an active role in it. He came up for
election in the early 1980s but lost. He participated in the referendum movement after it started and
30According to Sasaguchi, his official answer was as follows: (1) Maki-machi has no referendum
ordinance, so that it is impossible to carry it out, (2) we cannot spend public money and resources for a
referendum unless it is carried out by the town government.
27Quoted from Sasaiwai-shuzo Co. website (http://www.sasaiwai.com/touhyo/index.html) on Feb. 7, 2007
and translated by the authors. Sasaiwai-shuzo is Sasaguchi’s sake brewery and he has posted the story of
the local referendum movement. He also explained about the conversation in our interview.
31Some members said, “Though we expected the negative replies from the mayor and town council, we
did the request to confirm the views of the mayor and legislators.” Their intent from the beginning was to
proceed with the referendum. The name of the group also shows this. It is “A group to hold the
referendum on Maki-machi nuclear plant.”
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take any particular stance on the issue of nuclear power plant siting,32 and indeed
took various measures with great care to ensure the fairness of the referendum as
follows:
1. Disclose all conferences and meetings to everyone including mass media.
2. Protect citizens who might face risk if they express their opinion. Generally
speaking, residents hesitate to declare their opinion clearly in public because
they are constrained by complicated commercial or traditional relationships
within the local community. These social relationships are vital in a small
community. In some cases, to show individual opinion that may go against the
community’s interest is socially dangerous behavior. They requested that media
did not publicly identify dissenting citizens.
3. Maximize voting opportunities for citizens. They set the term to vote with more
than one station and continuing over more than one day. Additionally, voting
stations remained open until late evening to allow voters to keep their privacy
and flexibility.
4. They also created some mobile voting stations and performed door-to-door
visits. This was not only for voters’ convenience, but also to protect voters’
privacy (for example, to guard them from any harassment).
5. Entrust the poll watching and the safekeeping of the ballot boxes to the third
parties.33
The citizen’s referendum was carried out in January, 1995, and although the
campaign of the pro-nuclear group was severe,34 the result was that the number of
dissenting votes exceeded the number of votes that the mayor obtained at the
previous mayoral election. The referendum movement group deepened their
conviction that the people’s will on the nuclear plant issue should be confirmed
separately by these independent results. The pro-nuclear group was also shocked by
33They invited lawyers and university professors from outside Maki-machi as poll monitors. They also
invited members of the pro-nuclear group to monitor. They entrusted the ballot boxes to a warehouse
rental company.
34They strongly criticized the legitimacy of the referendum movement. Though they do not admit it, some
interviewees pointed out that many people were compelled not to go to polls by their employers. The pro-
group refused to participate in the citizen’s referendum. The figure of voting rate and balance of pro and
con votes shows the fact that pro-group did not go to voting station.
Table 1 The result of the “citizen’s referendum” in Maki-machi in January, 1995
Number of
ballots
Voting rate to all
registered voters
Affirmative ballots for the nuclear power plant plan 474 4.34%
Negative ballots for the nuclear power plant plan 9,854 43.11%
Invalid ballots 50 0.22%
Total ballots 10,378 45.40%
32Nakazawa (2005) quotes a member of the referendum movement group: “He (Sasaguchi) never
confessed his opinion on the nuclear plant plan even in the informal drinking meeting.” In our interview,
he never discussed the pros and cons. His point was solely about public opinion or the democratic process.
He has consistently argued those points.
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the results. The impact of this undeniable fact was the turning point of the whole
process Table 1.35
Following the result of the referendum, the group again called for an official
referendum. Just after the citizen’s referendum, in April, 1995, an election for town
council was scheduled. This referendum ordinance issue became one of the most
controversial points in the election campaign. At that time, 17 of the 22 council
members were anti-referendum legislators. However, after the unofficial referendum,
their position changed and many candidates pledged to support a referendum
ordinance in their election campaign. After the election, 12 out of 22 council
members were in favor of the referendum ordinance, although two suddenly changed
their mind before the deliberation on the referendum ordinance in the council.
Members of the referendum movement group were disappointed at their behavior
and protested, and many stakeholders believed that the ordinance would not be
approved. However, eventually the ordinance was approved at the council meeting
on June 25, 1995. It was said a pro-nuclear (anti-referendum ordinance) legislator
made a mistake at the vote. On that day, to prevent the vote of ordinance, many
motions were proposed by pro-nuclear council members and voting took place again
and again, so it was possible that someone was confused and made a mistake.
The ordinance included a prescription that the Mayor had to carry out the
referendum on the nuclear power plant plan within 90 days of the ordinance
approval. Pro-nuclear residents resorted to direct citizen petition to amend that strict
prescription. The town council, which was still ruled by the anti-referendum group,
accepted the petition and approved the amendment on October 3, 1995. The
ordinance was modified as follows: “The mayor decides whether or not to carry out
the local referendum. If the mayor decides to conduct it, he will carry it out under the
agreement of town council.” In other words, a referendum would be never carried
out as long as Mayor Sato was in office. This amendment actually eliminated the
chance to hold the referendum. Consequently, the referendum movement group
began a campaign to recall the mayor. It seemed that it would be very difficult to
collect the necessary number of signatures to call for a recall election because it was
not anonymous.36 It was predicted that citizens would hesitate to reveal their names
in public. But, contrary to this prediction, the required number of signatures was
collected in just 2 weeks. Mayor Sato recognized he had lost, and on December 15,
1995, he resigned of his own will before the recall election.
Takaaki Sasaguchi, the head of the referendum movement group was elected as
the new mayor on January 21, 1996,37 and he called the referendum in August. This
35Made by the authors, based on the data from our interviewees and Imai (2000).
36According to Japanese Local Autonomy Law, collected signs must be disclosed to the public by a local
election administration committee to prevent fraud.
37He got 8,569 ballots. The pro-nuclear group boycotted the election voting again, so that the voting rate
was 45.8%. Just before the election, two remarkable events occurred: the Monju FBR accident and the
Hanshin earthquake. The Monju accident eroded the public confidence in nuclear organizations, policies
and the safety of nuclear technology itself. The Hanshin earthquake killed more than 6,000 people in the
Hanshin area (around Kobe city), and people realized the powerlessness of civilization against the forces
of nature. These events could have influenced the residents voting behavior (but, no other potent candidate
elected in the Mayor election, in fact).
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time there was a higher voting rate of 88.29% and the dissenting vote ran up to
60.85% (53.73% of registered voters) Table 2.38
This result received a lot of publicity, and had an impact on the national
government and electric power companies. Mr. Sasaguchi kept his promise made
before the vote,39 and declared that he would not sell the land owned by the town,
which was necessary to proceed with the siting of the nuclear plant, and urged
Tohoku-EPCO to reconsider.
The company held onto the plan. The central government and industry officials,
as well as some experts, criticized the referendum, saying it had “no legal authority”
with respect to nuclear plant siting and the result should not be considered valid.40
Legally speaking that was true, but the argument did not have much impact on the
political validity of the referendum.
In order to make sure that the land would not be sold to a pro-nuclear group in
future, Mayor Sasaguchi decided to sell the land to residents who supported his
policy41 on August 30, 1999.42 In fact, the referendum movement group lost the
town council election in April, 1999 so they were concerned about the possibility
that the land would be sold to the utility company by a future mayor. This land
transaction was carried out in complete secrecy. Mayor Sasaguchi officially
announced the transaction on September 2, 1999.43
39He distributed a document to all households on the day before the vote. It contained the following
statement: “The conclusion decided by the sovereign residents themselves with sufficient deliberation is
unquestionably valid. I assume that we promote the construction plan if the affirmative ballots are in the
majority, or we never sell the land owned by town to the power company and the plan is canceled if the
negative ballots are in the majority. We the mayor and legislators have to receive the result and to obey it
in our administration from now.” (Translated by author).
40They also used the logic that the direct democracy method, like a referendum, was not suitable for
national level issues including nuclear power.
41“The decision of the town must reflect residents' will directly”.
43He decided this transaction without approval of the town council based on the law of local autonomy. It
allows themayor to process small transactions without any permission from the local council. In this case, the
land was under the limit of this allowance. And Sasaguchi legitimated this deal by the logic “based on the
result of the referendum”. On the other hand, former mayor Sato dared to call for the approval of town council
to ensure its legitimacy when he tried to sell that land to Tohoku-EPCO company in February, 1995. But he
faced to the strong opposition of residents and could not sit at the council meeting. This contrastive and ironic
consequence reminds us that we should think carefully on what the “democratic process” is.





Voting rate to all
Registered voters
Affirmative ballots for the nuclear power plant plan 7,904 38.55% 34.04%
Negative ballots for the nuclear power plant plan 12,478 60.85% 53.73%
Invalid ballots 121 0.59% 0.52%
Total ballots 20,503 88.29%
38Made by the authors, based on the data announced by the election board of Maki-machi.
42Many newspaper articles and other documents on the Maki-machi case describe them as the “anti-
nuclear” residents. Indeed, many of them had anti-nuclear opinions. But Sasaguchi called them “people
who respect the public consensus.”
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The pro-nuclear group criticized the decision, and asked the local government
auditor to conduct a special examination. But this request was rejected, and the pro-
nuclear group also failed in lawsuits against the local government. The case was
finally brought to the Supreme Court, in December, 2003, and the final ruling was
against the pro-nuclear group. Shortly after the judgment, Tohoku-EPCO announced
the cancellation of the project. Here we illustrate the consequences of these
processes in Fig. 1.45
Analysis of the Case — Beyond the “Deadlocked” Situation
The citizen’s referendum was managed by a citizen’s group and had no legal
authority. However, the result was considered valid since it was managed, in the
mayor’s opinion, in full fairness and with confidence. It was a completely informal
process but its result had substantial impact on a town decision. It was the turning





































Fig. 1 The social decision-making process of the Maki-machi case44
44Solid arrows indicate direct causal and chronological relationships and dotted arrows indicate not direct
but influential relationships. The later ones also show the consequences of change of agenda caused by
land issues.
45This figure shows a map of the events in Maki-machi. The vertical axis indicates how each event has
“formal” (= institutional and legal) basis; the horizontal axis expresses the time series. Solid arrows show
the direct causal links and dotted lines indicate background contexts.
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In the Maki-machi case, the process of the nuclear power plant siting had been
deadlocked for about 10 years because of the complicated political situation of the
town. So, first of all, we have to shed light on the subtle local situation in which
ordinary citizens lived. In the Japanese countryside, including towns such as Maki-
machi, people cast their vote for the candidate while considering complicated local
commercial, traditional, official and private relationships. These relationships are
often connected with the conservative political party (LDP), because the party had
the power to attract subsidies for social infrastructure improvements and agriculture
for many years. In rural areas of Japan, residents tend to believe that financial
support from the central government plays a critical role in rapid economic growth
and is an effective tool to overcome local problems such as the shrinking population
and structural recession of local industry. Indeed, inviting a nuclear power plant is
certainly an option for a community to improve their economic well-being, as a huge
amount of compensation (called “kofu-kin,” which means subsidy money in
Japanese) is given to a local community which accepts a nuclear power plant.46
However, some residents expressed concern over safety issues and some even
joined the anti-nuclear movement. As a result, nuclear power plant siting created
tension among residents. The town officials and economic executives belonged to
LDP and supported the siting plan. They managed the politics and economy of the
local community, and their power was quite strong inside the town. Of course, they
did not force residents to obey them. This political and economic structure was based
on a kind of unspoken rule. If people declare individual opinion, this can break
down the integration of the community, and this invites severe retaliation for the
dissenting individuals. So these complicated social relationships within the local
community should have had very strong effects on their decision.47 All actors inside
the local community constrained each other.
Traditionally, people do not vote “for the policy,” but “for the person.”48 The
local business community had made it known that they supported the nuclear plant,
and they were connected with the conservative political party. The issue receded
into the background and it was difficult to get it established as an election issue. The
traditional anti-nuclear movement also failed to obtain wide support from residents,
because for ordinary citizens to declare an opinion against those in power is
personally dangerous. They usually distanced themselves from “radical” political
and social movements.
Meanwhile, the land issues of the planned construction area also blocked the
progress of the siting procedure. People believed that the nuclear plant siting
procedure had made rapid progress, and the issue receded from the minds of
residents temporarily, however, internally professional politicians were still fiercely
disputing the issues.
46For example, if a large size nuclear plant (1.3 million kW) is accepted, about 90 billion yen of subsidy
money will be given to local government over 20 years at the start of commercial operation of the plant.
47Nakazawa (2005) explains this situation with the term “local regime,” inspired by the analysis studies of
community power structures in the US.
48An interviewee pointed out that Mayor Sato said, “Please trust me, please believe my personality,” in his
election campaign.
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The settlement of the land issues triggered the construction procedures again.
Mayor Sato and the conservative party took the opportunity to integrate the two
cliques inside the party to promote the siting process vigorously. They thought that
their internal conflict was the only problem left. Some people in the town felt anxiety
about nuclear technology, perhaps influenced by accidents that had occurred in the
deadlocked period (for example, Chernobyl), but they perhaps would not discard
their pro-nuclear policy because of political constraints. Traditional anti-nuclear
groups thus could not stop the process because of the lack of broad voter support.
The citizen’s referendum was the challenge. The members of the referendum
group said that they were motivated by a simple question: “Was public opinion
sufficiently consulted before the decision to restart the siting procedure?” But it was
difficult for them to secure credibility and legitimacy as they did not have any formal
or legal basis on which to claim such legitimacy. In addition, there was a concern
that they could be seen as a biased group (i.e., opponents of the nuclear project)
where complicated confrontations between “pro” and “con” factions existed.
The important factor is the careful and delicate considerations and arrangements
made by the referendum movement group. They took people’s anxiety into
consideration and made some important arrangements to mitigate this. They
consistently set up the target “to reflect public opinion by either-or vote.” They
focused only on the issue of nuclear plant siting, and maintained neutrality between
pro- and anti-nuclear sides—a point they explained repeatedly and explicitly. This
means that the campaign was an absolutely ad hoc movement, and was free from
any other political fight. Furthermore, as we mentioned above, they made
arrangements to keep voters’ privacy and to reduce their anxiety. Their efforts
lightened the political pressures embedded in the complicated local power structure.
But who did design these appropriate considerations and arrangements? How and
why was the group able to do that?
Effects of the “Relevant Marginal Actor” on Decision-making Processes
Considering the complicated structural and social factors in this case, we need to
consider a new concept to look at the actors involved. We would suggest the concept
of the “relevant marginal actor” to answer this question. It is inspired by the concept
of “relevant outsiders” proposed by Matsumoto et al. with reference to the
development and diffusion of a wind power plant.49 In their paper, they proposed
the notion of relevant outsiders to explain breakthroughs in path-dependent
deadlocked situations. According to that study, in Japan, a myth which argued that
the wind conditions of Japan were not suitable for wind power generation spoiled the
development of native Japanese wind turbine technology.50 This myth was believed
49Matsumoto et al. (2004).
50For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Company had the biggest portion of the wind turbine market
from 1980s to the beginnings of 1990s, but has now lost much of this. The Japanese domestic market is
almost completely overtaken by foreign (mainly European) manufacturers.
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by stakeholders and concerned experts alike. But in some recent cases, people who
were unaware of these contexts and were inspired by other independent ideas, played
a key role in the development and siting of wind power plants. Matsumoto calls
these marginal but strategic actors “relevant outsiders,” and pointed out their unique
role in overcoming locked-in situations.
Regarding this, we will consider the commonalities and differences between
“relevant outsider” and the well-known concept of “relevant social group” in the
SCOT program. We can observe a certain level of commonality between these two
concepts. According to the SCOT program, the difference in interpretation of
technological elements between different relevant social groups (“interpretive
flexibility”) plays a critical role in the shift of technological trends. In this way,
the effects of the “relevant outsider” seem to follow a similar mechanism. Stepping
into the details of our case, however, an important difference arises between the two
because what characterizes “relevant outsider” is its strategic ignorance rather than a
different interpretation springing from “interpretive flexibility” in general. In the
wind turbine case quoted above, for example, traditional stakeholders like engineers,
bureaucrats and other experts in the energy technology/policy fields had considered
wind power technology as a unpromising because of the myth (i.e., wind conditions
in Japan are not suitable for efficient wind power generation). They estimated its
potential contribution to “energy supply” by various technical measures such as
estimated capacity utilization rate, number of suitable plant site, stability of
generated electricity, effects on the power grids and so on. For them, it absolutely
represented “energy technology”. But for the “relevant outsider” who didn’t know
well about energy issues and the estimation of wind power technology in the expert
world, the wind turbine was recognized as a symbol of an environmental friendly
society.
Secondly, there is a difference in the definition of the “relevant” actor. In the
SCOT argument, it is the group in society which has particular properties (i.e., young
or elder, male or female, social class and so on) and is relevant to technology as
users or consumers. The group plays a critical role in the dynamics of technological
development and diffusion of technologies.51 This group is distinguished by
generally categorized, objective social properties. On the contrary, Matsumoto’s
“relevant outsider” is defined by a social function to be fulfilled in each particular
social context. Therefore, the critical properties which make the actor “relevant” tend
not to be general. Rather, it would be subtler, but unique conditions.
As for the social function of marginal agents, similar mechanisms can be
observed in our case. Individuals in the referendum movement group were not
affiliated with either the anti-nuclear group or the pro-nuclear group, so people
regarded them as distant from the longstanding power struggle over the issue. They
were the “new faces” in local politics.52 Of course, many of them were old residents
of the town, and well known there for their businesses. As mentioned above, the
leader of the group, Takaaki Sasaguchi, was the president of a very popular local
sake brewery. Every local resident recognized him as an important person in the
51See Pinch and Bijker (1987).
52Sasaguchi used this expression in his company’s web site.
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local community. But he was relatively free from any political stigma because he had
not joined in any previous political fight. So the referendum was somewhat protected
from political pressure from both sides.53 This independence can also be explained
by the fact that the group was able to fund the referendum on its own. If the
referendum was sponsored by any political faction, it would have been seen as
biased as well.
Moreover, they were also free from the “common sense” shared by traditional
citizen activists. There were several anti-nuclear citizen movements in the town, but
almost all of them were involved in the protest campaign against the national and
local governments and the electric power company. They also had the idea of a local
referendum, but they only called for it to politicians. The referendum group’s lawyer,
Tamio Takashima, said:
“It was unimaginable to carry out the local referendum by ourselves. We had
only called for it to the local governments and the town council.”
In Maki-machi, but also in other areas of Japan, traditional anti-nuclear activists
shared his beliefs. They had never considered the possibility of a citizen’s, self-
managed referendum. This shows the big difference between the traditional anti-
nuclear movement and the referendum movement group.
In terms of these social characteristics, they were relative outsiders in the local
political situation. They were marginal actors in the traditional decision-making
process. But they were not ignorant of politics. Learning the lessons from their own
experiences as self-employed businessmen, they understood the complicated
background of the decision-making processes very well, and knew of the many
difficulties: people’s anxiety about privacy, complex social relationships, the strong
power of the conservative political party, and so on. So they made many external and
operational arrangements throughout the referendum. At the same time, they were
independent from traditional political factions because of their independent funding
source. Therefore, they were able to design the process on their own terms.54
For example, both stakeholder actors and ordinary residents were obsessed with
the hostility and conflict between pro- and anti-nuclear sides, but the referendum
group introduced the idea that “to confirm the public opinion” should come before
everything. Like other democratic societies, “democratic” is the last word in political
controversy in this country. The group put greater emphasis on the democratic
process. So finally even the pro-nuclear group could not help but accept the result of
the referendum although they said that “a referendum without any legal basis is
inconsistent with representative democracy.” Their argument was concerned with
53On the contrary, not only pro-nuclear groups but also traditional anti-nuclear groups took offense against
the referendum movement group. Nakazawa (2005) introduces an episode; a member of the anti-group
protested to the referendum movement group shortly after it was established. He said, “If cons ballots lost
the vote, we will not be able to continue the movement. In that what will you do?” In fact, there was no
official relationship between the anti-group and referendum movement group until the cancellation of the
plant plan.
54Though they have been the traditional supporters of the conservative party for their own business benefit
and every resident knew or could guess this; they were not activists of the political activities. So, people
considered them to have a neutral stance, in our impression.
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institutional and formal procedures, but the result showed the actual public opinion.
In this entire process, we can observe the strategic thinking of the citizens’ group.
They succeeded in utilizing their own social characteristics to become a marginal
key agent of the process. So we can call them a relevant marginal actor.
The effects of these characteristics were critically important in the whole decision-
making process. In other words, they changed the interpretation of the critical points
of the siting decision-making process and utilized participatory methods. This social
function is similar to the effect of “relevant social group” in the case analyzed by the
SCOT program. It means that a relevant marginal actor would be crucial for the trials
to work well when someone tries to apply the referendum strategy elsewhere, or to
institutionalize some other approaches to enhance the degree of public participation,
public trust and effectiveness in decision-making processes.55
Concluding Remarks
Based on what is described above, we draw some implications for better
understanding of, and improvement in, the quality of the decision-making process
in technology policy.
As mentioned at the outset, we looked at the social decision-making process,
incorporating both formal and informal processes in this case study. In our analysis,
the informal processes seem to have played a significant role. Though the citizen’s
referendum of Maki-machi had no legal basis, this process functioned well as an
alternative to the formal one which could not work because of the local political
context.
Of course, it is best when the formal process works properly and so we tend to
consider the improvement or revision of the implemented formal processes.
However, generally speaking, every formal process encounters serious unexpected
problems when it is actually applied. Because the formal process is institutionalized
and fixed, it has little flexibility to adapt to the context and situation of each case.
The informal process, which we reviewed, is an ad hoc participatory process to
handle specific needs in the complicated context of the local area. It is notable that
this consequence was produced not by any expert dispatched from the central
government or other established actors but spontaneously by local residents.
This shows us the limits of institutional decision making or consensus building.
Of course, it is very important that we pay attention to the continuous improvement
of institutional decision making. However, it would be better to perpetually combine
the informal, flexible ad hoc process with the formal one.
We should not only review both the formal and informal processes, but also
analyze them carefully. Indeed, informal processes have been studied in political
science and other fields, but researchers tend to deal with it as something vulnerable
to external influence. Ordinary people tend to consider it as some kind of “backroom
55Of course, if there are no dead-locked situations, a relevant marginal actor is not essential to utilize some
kind of participatory method. But, in fact, those participatory methods are usually used as the tools to
resolve controversial, hostile and dead-locked situations. So, its functions are not negligible in most cases,
in our opinion.
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deal” or irregular case. In fact, no decision-making process consists only of formal
elements, and we found a very effective informal process in Maki-machi. Therefore
we would argue that we should give attention to the interface between formal and
informal processes.
Based on this particular case, we can find the social functions of the sociological
arrangements in the local community which break through the traditional political
and social situations characterized by the confronting ideas, considerations and
efforts of local actors. These factors constitute the local context. Local contexts had
been built up over many generations, so that it may seem impossible to change. If
stakeholders try to break through it, they usually cannot be free from the tacit
“common sense” of the local community and politics. Similarly, if someone tries to
transplant some kind of decision-making method from outside of the community
without deep insight into the local context, they cannot change the situation.
The relevant marginal actor plays a critically important role in the breakthrough
of deadlocked situations. The relevant marginal actor is an outsider with respect to
traditional politics, but who understands local contexts because they are not an
outsider relative to the local community.56 Of course, these functions come from the
structural and contextual factors of the whole social decision-making process, and
are not designed intentionally by some particular actor. Probably it is very difficult to
produce them at will. However, we need to take these elements into account in
considering decision making and utilization of participatory methods. At the very
least, we can collect decision-making process cases relating to local controversy
about (energy) technologies similar to Maki-machi and can analyze them. Based on
these knowledge databases, we will be able to typify cases and to propose some
practical options to ongoing cases.57
We should also pay attention to the pitfall of the “success - failure” dichotomy.58
We often judge the social or academic importance and value of decision-making
cases by only the outcome and the method. This judgment is strongly influenced by
the stance of the observer. Once we determine whether it was successful or not, we
often cease observing. This means that complicated but important factors in the cases
could escape notice. In this case study, we indicate several critical social factors
which enabled the informal process to work well. It is important to do in-depth
analysis to extract elemental factors to enrich our knowledge of the function and
characteristics of participatory methods and to improve the decision-making
processes involved.
56Wynne (1996) conceptualized the knowledge which created, accumulated and could be applied to local
community as the “local knowledge”. For his analysis on risk issues, also see Wynne (1987).
57Rowe and Frewer (2000) suggest two aspects which enable the evaluation of various kinds of
participatory processes. They propose “acceptance criteria” and “process criteria”. In our Maki-machi
case, referendums got very good evaluations in both of these two aspects. Abelson et al. (2003) proposes
frameworks to examine the relationships between the consequences of decision-making processes and
various aspects of the local situation. She also introduces and examines the cases of decision-making
process on public health issues in Ontario, Canada in Abelson (2001).
58As for the detailed analysis of this pitfall with particular reference to a complex relationship between
renewable energy development and global environmental problems, see Matsumoto (2005). For an
account which considers beyond the success or failure dichotomy, also see Matsumoto (2006), Chap. 6
Conclusion: Beyond Success or Failure.
Social Decision Making Processes in Local Contexts 71
We should carefully discuss the adoption and institutionalization of the latest
participatory methods. Considering the importance of the structural factors
mentioned above, we should not ignore the differences in the local situation that
depend on specific historical and regional contexts. For example, there is the
possibility that if we introduce a method to several different social contexts on the
same issue, the processes can create quite dissimilar consequences. We need to
identify the factors creating such dissimilarity, and specify the conditions which are
relevant to each method and issue through further case studies. This is applicable not
only in a power plant siting context but also to other various issues at the science-
technology-society interface.
Finally, we would argue that further sociological STS case studies can provide a
new way of thinking, which may help to identify the conditions in which the
particular participatory method works well. It can be complementary to the
knowledge of mainstream public participation studies.59 As mentioned at first, if
insufficient knowledge is available to identify the conditions which enable the
participatory method to work well, we may not only fail to utilize its potential, but
also make matters worse. We believe that further sociological STS case studies could
significantly link studies on public controversy and those in public engagement at
the science-technology-society interface.
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Appendix
List of Interviewees
– Naoto Ito (Reporter of the “Niigata Nippo” local newspaper) (2004.6.14)
– Takaaki Sasaguchi (Former Leader of “A group to hold the referendum on Maki
nuclear plant,” Former Mayor of Maki-machi) (2004.6.14)
– Tamio Takashima (Lawyer, Former Staff Member of “A group to hold the
referendum on Maki nuclear plant”) (2004.6.14)
– Mitsuo Ishida [Former Chairperson of “Nuclear Issue Panel of Maki-machi”
(Pro-Nuclear Group)] (2004.6.15)
Chronology of Maki-machi Case
End of 1960s Maki-machi nuclear power plant planned by Tohoku Electric
Power Corporation (Tohoku-EPCO)
59Irwin (2006) pointed out that the curious coexistence of the ‘new’ participatory process and ‘old’
technocracy which was based on so-called ‘sound science’ in UK science governance. He pointed out the
importance of not only the promotion and defense of public participation but also the critical investigation
of it.
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Purchased land without disclosing the official objective
1969 Local news paper (Niigata Nippo) revealed the siting plan
Tohoku-EPCO requested the cooperation of the Niigata prefec-
tural government and Maki-machi local government
May, 1971 Tohoku-EPCO officially announced the siting plan
December, 1977 Local consent secured (Maki-machi council approved the siting
plan)
June, 1979 Designated by national government as an important power plant
plan
December, 1980 Mayor of Maki-machi agreed with the siting plan
November, 1981 Governor of Niigata prefecture agreed with the siting plan
National government listed the Maki nuclear power plant in the
national power plant development plan
January, 1982 Tohoku-EPCO applied for the national safety review process
September, 1983 Tohoku-EPCO withdrew their application
It is revealed that several parts of the site were not secured
One issue was the uncertainty of ownership between town
government and a Buddhist temple. The other was a small
parcel of land owned by an anti-nuclear group
During 1980s No progress throughout 1980s during which local conservative
political parties were split on nuclear issues
Early 1990s Land issue finally settled
August, 1994 Mayor Kanji Sato was reelected and started promoting the
nuclear plant again.
But the number of votes gained by anti-nuclear candidates was
larger than that of Mayor Sato
October, 1994 “A Group for public referendum on Maki nuclear power plant”
was established
February, 1995 Although Mayor Sato tried to get the approval of the town
council to sell the land, which is owned by town to Tohoku-
EPCO, the council meeting was blocked by a residents’ protest
demonstration, and he failed in the transaction.
January, 1995 Citizen’s referendum was conducted
Registered voters 22,858 / Total number of votes 10,378 (voting
rate 45.4%)
Yes 474 / No 9,854 / Invalid 50 (95% of vote went to “No”)
Number of “No” votes exceeded number of votes for the last
reelection of Mayor Sato (9,006)
October, 1995 Public referendum ordinance passed but later amended to allow
mayor to decide the date
December, 1995 Recall mayor movement initiated by citizens
Number of signatures exceeded the minimum number specified
by the law
Mayor Sato resigned before recall vote
January, 1996 Takaaki Sasaguchi (leader of the referendum group) elected
mayor
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June, 1996 Town council approved the ordinance for public referendum on
Maki nuclear plant
August, 1997 Referendum on “Maki Nuclear Power Plant” conducted under
the local referendum ordinance
Registered voters 23,222 / Total number of votes 20,503 (voting
rate 88.3%)
Yes 7,904 / No 12,478 / Invalid 121 (60% of vote went to “No”)
August, 1999 Mayor Sasaguchi sold the land to citizens who strongly supported
the result of the referendum (it meant opposition to the nuclear
plant)
April, 2000 A Pro-nuclear group took legal action arguing that land sale was
not legally effective
December, 2003 Supreme Court made final decision, pro-nuclear group lost
Tohoku-EPCO officially announced the cancellation of the
Maki-machi nuclear power plant plan
[Made by the authors, based on the information from our
interviews, Imai (2000) and Niigata Nippo Press Bureau (1997)]
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